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Introduction and background 
 
This dissertation is associated with the transnational corporations’ (TNCs) tax administration and tax-
laws. It is of note that any firm which engages in international operations is not to be taken as TNC 
because that firm might only take orders from foreign countries and subsequently export the required 
services and products to that country. Simply put, it merely engages in trading with a foreign country. 
To the contrary, an enterprise is said to be a TNC when it establishes its presence in the foreign country 
and starts trading within that foreign country, and not with that foreign country.1 When it comes to closely 
analysing the trading activities of TNCs, they are associated with the problem of dual international 
taxation. For instance, the home country of TNC might demand a tax on any accumulated gain from its 
trading activities, but those foreign countries wherein the TNC trades might also claim taxes on the 
gains derived from the trading activities likewise. This implies that the TNC would be vulnerable to be 
taxed twice, first from its home country, and second, from the countries where it performs its business 
activities. 
 
In this context, Jessup gave many lectures centred on the subject of Transnational law in 1956.2 Jessup 
came across the fact that transnational law is a great subject of debate given the post-world-war-II 
nations were competing and cooperating so as to stay away from the double taxation that was also the 
main element of agenda during those days. There was a great need to allocate and fix the taxation 
rights so that taxation from many countries do not overlap and give a dent to TNCs savings. But as a 
matter of fact, there has been a great international crises of tax legitimacy to date thanks to the inability 
to finding a legitimate and effective way to establish an efficient and fair taxation mechanism of income 
derived from the diverse flow of revenues.3 Moreover, the international tax avoidance coupled with the 
facilities of offshore financial centres and tax havens for sheltering wealth contributed much to the debt 
crisis of those countries that do not fall in the category of developed nations. 
 
                                                 
1 Stanley S Surrey, J D R Adams and J Whalley, 'The International Taxation of Multinational 
Enterprises' (1980). 
2 Philip C Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press 1956) 70. 
3 SOL Picciotto, 'International Business Taxation: A Study in The Internationalization of Business 
Regulation’ (2013) 63 British Yearbook of International Law 490. 
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Also, the different types of taxation systems create uncertainty on and off both for those who administer 
the taxes, as well as those who pay it. The coexistence of different taxes cultivates the creation of costly 
disputes to both TNCs and the tax administrators. To cater to this, different types of tax harmonising 
strategies have brought in practice so as to increase and enhance the compliance of TNCs. But these 
tax harmonisation techniques have their own pitfalls. When it comes to examining international taxation, 
a study conducted by Genschel and Rixen is worth noting where they highlighted that the “transnational 
legal order” of international taxation which is mainly focused on “double taxation relief” has inadvertently 
given rise to tax competition.4 The reason being, they provide taxpayers with the new set of options to 
reduce their tax burden through the process of cross-border tax arbitrage and leave governments 
vulnerable to compete by aggressive low-tax strategies through inbound tax arbitrage flows.   
 
Given the facts stated above, this dissertation takes a stance that the TNCs, in this interrelated complex 
globalisation phenomenon, have brought in a great expansion of companies’ interaction across borders. 
At the same time, there is a vivid gap of finding the right answer of power and degree to which 
transnational corporations’ tax administration and tax-laws are legitimate and authoritative in the 
globalized world.5 This dissertation is going to present the literature review which would hold general 
taxation history and international taxation, key philosophies behind international tax policies, overview 
of EU and US tax systems for TNCs, and a few other relevant topics in the following section. The 
literature review section is very important in this dissertation on the score that in order to take up an 
effective discussion of taxation, it is imperative to review its historical background, as well as the latest 
taxation practices for TNCs in this era of globalisation.  
 
The literature review section in the current dissertation would highlight the historical background of 
taxation and international taxation at large with a focus on a few key philosophies behind international 
tax policies, an eye on the Ills of the international taxation coupled with the tax optimising strategies 
employed by TNCs on a global scale. The next section will give a detailed account on the tax 
administration measures adopted by international jurisdictions so as to counter/control the tax evasion 
and tax avoidance strategies of the transnational corporations. The third section titled as “Methodology 
                                                 
4 Philipp Genschel and Thomas Rixen, Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of 
International Taxation (Cambridge University Press 2015) 154-183. 
5 Richard J Vann, 'Improving Tax Law Improvement: An International Perspective' (1995) Aust1 193. 
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section” is going to give a brief account on the methodology, which is a kind of a comparative study, but 
this comparison is not made in statistical terms or by comparing different sets of variables as in normal 
comparative studies. The current methodology in this dissertation revolves around taking a close look 
at both sides i.e. from the TNCs side their tax evasion and evading strategies, and the tax administration 
authorities’ side, their strengths and weaknesses, and then performing an all-inclusive critical analysis 
thereby seeking answer to the main title i.e. “to what extent transnational corporations’ tax 
administration and tax-laws are legitimate and authoritative in the globalized world”. After the 
methodology section, the dissertation would highlight the various tax administration strategies 
employed by the tax administration authorities with a key focus on EU and USA jurisdictions. The last 
section would be a critical analysis discussion regarding the legitimacy and authority of tax 
administration and tax laws of TNCs. The topic of Transnational corporation taxation and the 
corresponding topic of tax administration authorities is extremely important because there has been 
very little clarity and transparency provided to the general public in this context. On one side, taxation 
on TNCs provide revenues to the countries, therefore, countries try to increase their revenues by 
expanding the domain of their tax base to the TNCs. To make it possible, countries in different 
jurisdictions enact pertinent taxation laws so that the TNCs pay their fair share of taxes and 
subsequently, the governments spend this money on the citizens’ welfare. But TNCs, on the other hand, 
play with the taxation laws for the sole purpose of doubling their profits exponentially by either avoiding 
or evading the taxes. As a result, the TNCs get stronger and stronger, they intend to employ tax 
avoidance strategies to give an exponential rise to their profits and the countries in different jurisdictions 
fail to collect the desired taxation money as a consequence. This whole scenario gives credence to the 
view that taxation law, its authority to be enforced correctly, and the corresponding authority of the 
TNCs to either comply with the law or to toy with it, should be judged critically. This is where the current 
dissertation and its structure come handy because it critically investigates the taxation law from both 
sides of the continuum. Not only this structure provides the reader with a close eye on historical 
background of taxation, international taxation, and the corresponding tax optimising strategies 
employed by the transnational corporations and the tax administration laws in different jurisdictions, but 
it also gives a philosophical and comparative investigation regarding the legitimation and authority of 
TNCs in terms of complying with the tax laws and the legitimation and authority of tax administration 
authorities in terms of enforcing these taxation laws in different jurisdictions. The whole structure of the 
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dissertation provides a philosophical investigation without falling prey to statistical terms and formulas 
that are normally employed in the discussions relevant to taxation laws. This is where the current 
structure and mode of investigation become peculiar and interesting in the context of the taxation law 
all along the line. The second reason for selecting the current structure is that the researcher wants that 
even an ordinary layman should be able to understand this hard topic of taxation without delving deep 
into the statistical or mathematical investigations. Hence, the structure is feasible and potent enough to 
bring a hard topic in soft language without needing tough academic qualification on the one hand, and 
it also provides a deep critical investigation into the matter of taxation law that would benefit the tax 
administration authorities to correctly enact their legislations, and is highly likely to inform and guide the 
TNCs to comply with the taxation laws as well. 
 
Literature review 
 
Historical background of taxation and international taxation 
 
The marks of taxation existed collectively and could be found in the Colonial American period.6 7  
However, it was 1634 when the very first law in the USA colonies was enacted in the State of 
Massachusetts Bay. At that point in time, the taxation law was mainly applied to the property (particularly 
land). It was the era when most of the colonial States used to tax their citizens based on the land 
property that they hold. The general law of taxation was later revised with the add-on of “ability” and 
“faculty” notions thereby the idea of taxation from tangible land was shifted towards intangible things.8 
Even in Rhode Island, the faculty tax notion was applied in the manner that every citizen was asked to 
assess the worth of their neighbour so as to assess the tax liabilities of their neighbour and subsequently 
suggest the tax that the neighbour should be liable for. Slowly and steadily, the taxation system in 
Colonial America included the taxation on profits of all professions and faculties. In the colonial USA, 
                                                 
6 Delos O Kinsman, The Income Tax in The Commonwealths of The United States (Macmillan Co 
1903). 
7 William Zebina Ripley, The Financial History of Virginia, 1609-1776 (AMS Press 1970) 1609-1776. 
8 A B Wolfe, 'The Income Tax, A Study of The History, Theory, And Practice of Income Taxation at 
Home and Abroad. Edwin R. A. Seligman' (1912) 17 American Journal of Sociology 3. 
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there was seldom any question on whether to tax or not, but the debate was still on regarding “how to 
tax” the citizens. It was though hard to imagine any taxation beyond the tangible physical property in 
the first place, but later on, in the quest to increase their revenues by expanding the domain of tax base, 
many colonies adopted the taxation based on the intangible entities of abilities and faculties so as to 
bring that portion of population into the tax-net which did not hold the physical land-related property. 
The latest taxes in the United States that are also referred to as “modern tax statutes” are associated 
with the 16th Amendment in the US constitution.9 Since then, several tax statutes have been modified 
in the form of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to date.  
 
The history of taxation clearly shows that one of the most omnipresent tools behind taxation was to 
raise revenues so that the territories could be endowed defence, as well as the provision of basic social 
services for the residents, or at times, taxation was also enacted to honour the royalties.10 Taxation was 
applied at national levels to cater to the transactions that occur within a State. The 16th Amendment in 
the USA law legitimized congress constitutional power so that they could tax the citizens using broad 
terms. However, these national taxations raised several debates when cross border activities became 
involved and appeared as a great area of concern. Questions raised on and off about the legitimacy of 
sovereign taxing powers of many countries to apply taxation on the same income. It was obviously clear 
that the transnational economic activities which involve cross border transactions would create double 
taxation problems around the globe. The reason being, when a resident of another country (the 
residency country) earns an income by doing business in another country (the source country), then 
both countries have valid legal reasons to tax the citizen or corporation likewise. Also, the main exercise 
of international taxation lied in the task of resolving the competing claims of the source country and the 
residence country so as to avoid the double taxation which is a common occurrence when both 
countries try to exercise their legitimate powers with regard to taxation.  
 
When the countries came across this situation after the world war I, the League of Nations appointed a 
commission with four top-rated economists so that they find a viable solution to the said taxation issue.11 
                                                 
9 Harry Hubbard, 'The Sixteenth Amendment' (1920) 33 Harvard Law Review 794. 
10 Diane M Ring, ‘What' S at Stake in The Sovereignty Debate? International Tax and The Nation-
State’ (2008) Va 156. 
11 SOL Picciotto, 'International Business Taxation: A Study in The Internationalization of Business 
Regulation’ (2013) 63 British Yearbook of International Law 490. 
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Professor Seligman of the USA presented his argument that only the residence country should levy 
taxation whereas the source country should only ensure the non-occurrence of double taxation. To the 
contrary, it was also debated that only the country of source should levy the taxation whereas the 
residence country only needs to ensure the non-occurrence of double taxation. The League of Nations 
found a middle ground to the issue and published their report in 1923, famously know by the name 
“Great Compromise” wherein the source country was allowed to levy the taxation on active income (the 
income where there is a material participation as well as the income from salaries, tips, and wages) 
whereas the residence country was allowed to levy taxation charges on passive income (the income 
which is derived from an enterprise wherein there is no material involvement of a person in that 
enterprise).12 The international tax regime was shaped with this “Great Compromise” for almost a 
century. It is of note that the subsequent international tax treaties and laws were formulated on the 
same principles of great compromise in terms of rightly allocating the power to tax. This also gave a 
“certain no” to the question whether double taxation should be allowed only on the score that the 
business had a cross border character. 
 
Nevertheless, when the economists were shaping the great comprise, they did not imagine how much 
the international taxation would expand with intense international economic activity in the coming 
decades. The creation of multinational companies dominated the business landscape where the past 
solutions were certainly inappropriate. In the United States, FTC Act of 1918 was formulated until 1960 
(age of benefits) with the key argument that the benefits conferred by the taxing state should be the 
main foundation upon which taxing jurisdiction should be grounded.13 The subsequent era of 1961-
1980 was the “age of neutrality” in which Kennedy administration promoted the concept of efficiency 
rather than the benefits afforded by the state. Then came the “age of competition” era 1981-1997 
wherein the US tax policy was formulated on competitiveness and competition, therefore, this era was 
marked with a reduced focus on the US residence-based taxation. The final era 1998 till today, marks 
the need for a coordinated action in taxation so as to avoid double non-taxation, as well as accomplish 
the competitiveness at the same time. This era is famously recognised as “age of cooperation”. This is 
                                                 
12 Reuven S Avi-Yonah, 'Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification' (1995) Tex 
1301. 
13 Reuven S Avi-Yonah, 'All of A Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation' 
(2005) Va 313. 
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the era in which the United States joined hands with European counterparts such as OECD so that a 
coordinated effort could be taken in formulating a coordinated tax policy for and with the member states. 
This “age of cooperation” resulted in the formulation of many tax treaties.  
 
This brief history of taxation coupled with the historical overview of international taxation wherein the 
US taxation trajectory took a U-turn from source-based taxation to residence-based taxation and back, 
although show activism of international partners to compete and cooperate, still, does not sufficiently 
answer the question how the double taxation and double non-taxation could be avoided. 
 
Key Philosophies behind international tax policies 
 
To attract investments 
The very first idea behind the imposition of tax laws in many countries was backed up by the scope of 
attracting investments. One of the major reasons behind this is that the world has become a global 
village and many countries try to attract major multinational companies so that they invest and do 
business. This is why many countries, both developed and non-developed have been coming with 
various tax incentives coupled with diverse and attractive fiscal strategies which include but not limited 
to tax incentives on financing, deferrals of custom taxes on imports, targeted tax exemptions, targeted 
reduced tax rates, investment tax allowances and tax credits, tax holidays and special zones. These 
measures are centred upon bringing foreign direct investment (FDI) in these countries to stimulate 
growth in their respective industries and in their business and economic sectors. Special zones are 
created in different countries so as to lenient labour requirements, increase investment, optimize 
taxation, and they are still being utilised as tax incentives despite the reservations posed by various 
commentators in terms of their capabilities to attract investments.14 As a matter of fact, almost all types 
of tax incentives are being used throughout the globe, but the question remains whether they serve the 
purpose of attracting foreign investment and subsequent boost in growth?15  
 
                                                 
14 Aradhna Aggarwal, 'Special Economic Zones: Revisiting the Policy Debate' (2006) EAPW 4533-
4536. 
15 Claudio Agostini and Soraphol Tulayasathien, Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment (2006) 
RG 1. 
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While critically analysing the philosophy to attract investments like foreign investments, the researcher 
recommends that only relying on the tax incentive programs might not produce the desired results to 
attract foreign investment. For example, if Germany offers tax incentives and Poland follows likewise, 
then the foreign investments into Germany might not be large enough because the same tax incentives 
are available in the adjacent country Poland as well. Evidence also suggests that investors gauge 
different jurisdictions related strategic tax setting behaviour and then its impact on the effectivity of tax 
incentive programs.16 It does not mean that investors do not take tax incentives into consideration when 
they formulate their strategy of foreign investment, but as a matter of fact, it becomes hard for a 
jurisdiction to attract investors only on the grounds of tax incentives thanks to the setting of tax benefits 
within the strategic interaction among various jurisdictions. For example, in addition to the provision of 
tax incentives, Germany can choose whether she would follow a certain strategy to facilitate 
investments such as differentiation leader strategy or price leader strategy, or some other strategy in 
place to facilitate the foreign investment alongside the tax incentives in place.  
 
Opening markets for foreign countries and encouraging exports  
The second idea for making and implementing taxation laws is based on opening markets for foreign 
countries and encouraging exports. It has been acknowledged that one of the most potent engines of 
growth is “international trade”. To encourage exports and market openness throughout the world, one 
of the major international organisations “International Monetary Fund” (IMF) is established so that 
financial assistance is provided to the developing countries. 17  The international trade has been 
increased after the successful implementation of IMF program especially in the developing countries 
which gives credence to the view that the economy gets a boosting effect with more trade.18 In this 
scenario, the taxation law, especially when it comes to implementing international taxation, becomes 
extremely important to provide more clarity and transparency so that developing countries can promote 
exports in the foreign countries and then measure their market success accordingly. As a matter of fact, 
the market openness and the exports promotion normally translate into national and international tax 
rules, which again struggle to give a balance into the residency-based and source-based taxation.  
                                                 
16 Ibid.  
17 International Monetary Fund, 'Financial Crisis in Developing Countries and Structural Weaknesses 
of The Financial System' (1989) 89 IMF Working Papers. 
18 John H Barton and others, The Evolution of The Trade Regime (Princeton University Press 2010). 
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While critically analysing aspect of foreign trade, the researcher deems that the composition and size 
of the trade might get influenced by the structure of taxes, and the varying considerations of trade might 
impact the tax designs alike. The reason being, taxes could be the trade determinant1920, but taxes can 
also boost as well as restrict trade. For example, since trade is considered as the difference between 
consumption and production, the trade would be reduced if taxes are imposed on particular types of 
consumption and there is an importable good involved. To the contrary, the trade will be promoted if 
there is an exportable good involved. Beyond doubt, taxes increase revenues, but they should be 
imposed as neutral as possible in terms of impacting the trade, and taxes should not undermine the 
international level competition as well. An extensive discussion in tax design objectives is available in 
literature.21 Hence, in this regard, the openness of markets for foreign countries is good but the varying 
interactions between international trade and suitable tax design should be taken into consideration as 
well. It is also a great piece of question whether the countries should heavily rely on the mechanisms 
which rely less on trade & taxes like tariffs or countries should specifically focus on those taxes which 
are broadly-based like “value-added tax” (VAT).22 So, all these things should be taken into consideration 
when countries try to open markets and encourage trade activities including exports.  
 
To provide simplest taxation law 
When it comes to taxation laws, there is also a great need for tax-related simplicity, both from it is 
economic, as well as from a legal perspective. Simply put, the taxation law should be legally simple and 
clear so that it could be read, comprehended, and applied to real practical scenarios.23 That is to 
say, the taxation law should be clear, consistent, and certain. Here clear/clarity in taxation means the 
taxation should have clarity not only to the legislation’s linguistic expression, but also on the drafter’s 
organizational scheme alike. Consistency reflects the linkage, harmonization, and coordination among 
                                                 
19 James R Melvin, 'Commodity Taxation as A Determinant of Trade' (1970) 3 The Canadian Journal 
of Economics 62-78. 
20 H J Krauklis and J R Melvin, The Tax Structure and Canadian Trade (1977) 3 Canadian Public 
Policy / Analyse de Politiques 397. 
21 Richard M Bird, Richard A Musgrave and Peggy B Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice (McGraw-Hill, 1989). 
22 Ben Lockwood, David De Meza and Gareth D Myles, 'When Are Origin and Destination Regimes 
Equivalent?' (1994) 1 ITPF 5-24. 
23 Binh Tran-Nam, 'Tax reform and tax simplicity: a new and simpler tax system' (2000) UNSWLJ 241. 
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all legislation parties plus the law, at any given point, should not have contradiction with any other tax 
legislation adopted in the said jurisdiction. The last requirement that law should be certain/certainty 
reflects that with reasonable efforts coupled with minimal supply of relevant data, the true tax liability of 
the taxpayer should be calculated. That is to say, by asking simple questions, it should be easy to 
calculate the taxpayer’s liability. Same way, in order to provide simple international tax rules, they need 
to be simple because only that way they would achieve optimum administration of tax. And in case of 
developing countries, taxation laws should be made as simple as possible because many developing 
countries have rejected the OECD imposed transfer pricing regulations on the score that overly 
complexity of these regulations do not serve the purpose of satisfying developing countries tax 
administrators to perfectly apply those taxes in their countries.  
 
While critically examining the tax simplification concept, the researcher deems that simplicity in taxation 
is a multi-dimensional notion because its measurement could be achieved in varying manners. For 
example, in terms of the simplicity in the format of the tax legislation, in terms of simplicity in the content 
of tax legislation, how tax administration authorities and taxpayer companies respond to the tax law, 
and what is the level of cost-effectiveness in order to operate tax.24 While the key philosophies relevant 
to tax simplicity advocate that simplicity is desirable and a pertinent thing to achieve in taxation law, but 
as a matter of fact, the simple concept might be too much exaggerated in the sense that it should not 
be taken as a sole focus of an excellent tax system and neither it should be taken as a concept which 
is static. For instance, if the economy is less developed, then it is feasible to simplify the taxation, but 
what if the economy is mature and the commercial transactions, business organisations, and market 
structures grow swiftly in a complex manner? In that case, the complexity in tax law would be a normal 
phenomenon. Furthermore, tax simplicity is not a prosaic task to achieve at once because tax 
administration authorities and the taxpayers frequently demand changes in taxation law.25 In a nutshell, 
the entire focus should not be on making the tax simple but making it relevant to the economic values 
and conditions of the market at large.  
 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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Simplicity remains one of the prime objectives of structuring this dissertation in a unique way and 
employing the methodology which is observable and understandable to even a layman. The reason 
being, the researcher deems that most of the taxation related dissertations and journals focus on the 
mathematical and statistical terms, therefore, they are only understandable to certain types of people 
who have a professional knack on the subject. On the flip side, if a layman tries to comprehend the 
subject, he cannot get along with the hard concepts, therefore, the taxation matters are mostly 
overlooked by the general public. In this regard, the simplest yet informative structure of this dissertation 
as well as the comparative analysis which focuses on the critical examination on both sides of the 
continuum without giving much focus on mathematical or statistical terms, provides it an upper edge 
over other papers written on the same subject. 
 
Overview of the Ills of the International Taxation 
 
When it comes to examining international taxation, it does not mean that there is an absolute single 
taxation system which is independent of all the countries and/or above all other countries that are used 
to govern the taxation in this era of globalisation. To the contrary, the international taxation is based on 
the cooperation between some international organisations and different countries so that the taxation 
against international income could be calculated. As explained above, this system of international 
taxation was enacted to eliminate the occurrences of double taxation. The current bedrock foundation 
of international taxation is strongly associated with the Arm’s Length Principle.26 This principle examines 
the transaction, disregards the character of the related parties, and ascertains that the arm’s length 
price or the true economics of the deal, are accomplished. Currently, there is a great commotion with 
regard to the ills of the international taxation, and there is an outcry that only simple citizens pay the 
taxes whereas the huge and wealthy corporations take leverage of the broken international tax system 
and they enjoy the options of what and where to pay the taxation.27 The outcry and lamentations by the 
international body are not just stories, but they are the real facts. For example, it has been reported that 
without paying any taxes, the UK Company Starbucks managed to accumulate around 700 million USD 
                                                 
26 Chongwoo Choe and Charles e Hyde, 'Multinational Transfer Pricing, Tax Arbitrage and The Arm's 
Length Principle' (2008) 83 Economic Record 398-404. 
27 Houston, J and Tran, A, A survey of tax evasion using the randomized response technique. 
Advances in taxation (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2001) 69-94. 
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in sales in the year 2012.28 The same is true for other heavyweight companies such as Google, 
Amazon, Apple, etc since they have managed to save millions of taxes despite their billions of worldwide 
sales. 
 
The issue of Transfer Pricing 
The very first ill associated with international taxation is the issue of transfer pricing which is the most 
challenging obstacle faced by the tax policymakers and administrators in the backdrop of international 
taxation for Multinational companies. In this scenario, when a multinational company manufactures a 
product in one country and then sells it with a subsidiary in another country, then the multinational 
company can enjoy the price manipulation by playing the intra-group price based on the low tax 
jurisdiction.29 For instance, if a US multinational company manufactures a phone at a cost of $20, then 
it can establish a wholly-owned subsidiary in Uganda which would be utilised to sell the phones to the 
Uganda market. This is where the US MNE would be able to enjoy the intra-group association with its 
wholly-owned Uganda Subsidiary (Uganda Sub). If both countries fall in the category of same tax 
jurisdiction, then there would be no taxation problem because US MNE would file $20 manufacturing 
cost, and Uganda Sub would file $20 distribution cost, and both would file a consolidated returns of a 
net gain of $60 when the phone is finally sold to the customer at a cost of $100. But when the two 
countries fall under separate tax jurisdictions, then the US MNE would play the intra-group transaction 
through a continuum of possible prices. So, the US MNE would play with the taxation, that is to say, it 
defeats the purpose of taxation by manipulating the location of profits. The other problem is that 
because this transfer pricing is only available to the wealthy and huge MNEs, it also harms the 
competition in response since small and medium-sized enterprises (SME's) do not enjoy this facility. It 
is legally allowed and justifiable that the TNCs should structure their internal flows without any outside 
intervention, but one could help saying that there could be massive loss in terms of collecting tax 
revenues if TNCs determine the transfer pricing independently. In this context, even the TNCs can enjoy 
the fake transfers as well. As a matter of fact, struggles to curb the abuses of transfer pricing are so 
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many, still the world is struggling to stop the loopholes of various defence mechanisms that have been 
opted against the transfer pricing. 
 
The use of debt allocation to achieve earning stripping  
This is another type of ill commonly procured by the TNCs wherein they borrow from the low tax 
jurisdiction to the high tax jurisdiction, thereby generating interest deductions in the high tax jurisdiction 
through the subsequent interest payments thus securing more income in the low tax jurisdiction. As a 
matter of fact, without even exposing the company as a whole, and not a change in the overall debt 
profile, a multi-national company can make use of this earning stripping technique by granting a loan to 
its US subsidiary from a low or non-taxed jurisdiction with the effect that US taxation would be minimized 
or eliminated altogether.30 This implies that tax planning has a strong influence on the MNEs profits 
based on their location and distribution of taxable profits.31 Many countries and tax authorities in the 
developed world have implemented better systems to curb this type of debt usage and interest to shift 
profits phenomenon.32 Rules and regulations are continuously being implemented by many developed 
nations so as to control the MNEs ability to gain profits from earning stripping technique. To the contrary, 
in the case of developing countries, the implementation of these systems is still far from achievable 
because these countries face significant difficulties when enforcing such rules. Also, if they import these 
taxation mechanisms in their countries, they do not have equal expertise as afforded by major TNCs.  
 
The Hybrid mismatch arrangements 
This is another type of ill in international taxation in the context of TNCs which has a disastrous effect 
on the intended effectivity of international taxation.33 In this type of arrangement, the TNCs exploit the 
differences in the national tax treatment of a transfer, an entity, or of an instrument between two or more 
than two countries. This arrangement leads to either double non-taxation in both countries, or a long-
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term tax deferral, which has also an identical effect of double non-taxation. The hybrid mismatching is 
only allowed to TNCs which frequently put a dent into the international taxation mechanisms. The TNCs 
require a hybrid entity to make it work which is not treated as transparent for tax purposes in one country 
whereas transparent for tax purposes in another country. In this scenario, the taxpayer enjoys a 
deduction in one country whereas no corresponding inclusion in another, or the TNC would be able to 
enjoy foreign tax credit generation which would not be possible if such hybrid arrangements were not 
in place. This implies that even within the scope of international taxation rules and legislation, this 
seemingly compliance of hybrid mismatching results in distortion of the international taxation practices, 
put a negative impact on tax revenues (by lowering overall tax burden on the taxpayer (TNC), as well 
as draining the tax revenues of either all the countries involved or any one of them). As a matter of fact, 
these tax liberties are only provided to the TNCs who are operating in two countries at the very least 
whereas other SME's cannot enjoy these benefits which is certainly not recommended when it comes 
to pushing the tax competition in this era of globalization, a situation which only give preference to the 
TNC group whilst ignoring the applicability to the other groups in competition. Many efforts have been 
made to curb the hybrid mismatching phenomenon in international transactions so that the negative 
effects of these arrangements could be minimized or negated, for instance, around $3.5 billion hybrid 
mismatch transactions were involved in the United States.34 Similarly, in 2009, the hybrid mismatch 
transactions in New Zealand involved approx. 1.5 billion. If the world witnesses more hybrid mismatch 
cases in the coming years, then it would equate to the TNCs manipulation of international taxation rules 
in their international operations. 
 
If one reads the section of transfer pricing, he could not miss the simplest example provided to the 
reader where a US multinational company takes benefit of the transfer pricing phenomenon by 
establishing a Uganda subsidiary. This is to ensure that the reader gets familiar with the hard topic of 
transfer pricing with the simplest of examples. The researcher tried to get familiar with this concept by 
reading a few journals, but either they just scratch the surface of the topic or they were too hard to 
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understand. 3536  This is one of the reasons for employing the simplest structure throughout the 
dissertation that is comprehensive and all-inclusive, yet easily understandable all along the line. 
 
Tax optimizing strategies employed by TNCs 
 
Avoiding taxation through tax havens 
Due to the cross-country nature of their transactions, the TNCs employ a diverse number of techniques 
so as to take liberty from the contradictions and loopholes in tax legislation around the globe. In this 
scenario, a broad number of techniques such as the abuse of intra-firm transfer pricing, the preferential 
tax schemes, and the role of tax havens lead to double non-taxation. In early 2013, the protestors in 
the United Kingdom seized Starbucks branches in the wake of their tax-evading strategies given the 
fact that Starbucks admitted in 2012 that they would pay approx. 16 million dollars to the UK tax 
authorities so that the controversy over their virtually non-existent tax bill could be settled.37 Also, many 
of the world’s largest TNCs operating in many other sectors happened to be involved in paying no 
taxation on their cross-border transactions. As a matter of fact, it has been reported that alone UK has 
a tax gap which is 122 billion GBP each year which reflects the difference between what tax had to be 
paid in the United Kingdom and the tax which was actually paid.38 This broad tax gap is enough even 
to cover the entire UK’s education budget alone in addition to a surplus of 20 billion GBP. This is the 
reason why G20 is intensifying their efforts to tax TNCs since TNCs make use of many illegal techniques 
to avoid and evade taxes over their offshore transactions. For instance, the TNCs take the liberty of 
using tax havens which reflects the jurisdictions that permit them to evade taxes. There are certain 
criteria to be a tax haven country. For example, there could be certain assets in a country which would 
be low taxed or not taxed at all such as shares, bonds, intellectual property rights, and these assets are 
often granted to offshore residents only. Secondly, there could be low level of regulation for legal entities 
like trusts, foundations, or companies, therefore, no requirement of initial capital for setting up a legal 
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entity in addition to weak due diligence requirements. Thirdly, there could a guarantee of strong secrecy 
such as the country would guarantee no cooperation with international tax authorities, the entities would 
not be publicly registered etc. It is argued that to be a tax haven country, the country does not need to 
fulfil all of the above criteria, but as a matter of fact, most of the tax haven countries normally fulfil these 
criteria. 
 
Also, only small countries and remote islands are not included in the category of tax haven countries, 
even the developed countries also provide tax havens to the TNCs. For example, affiliates of many 
TNCs take US State of Delaware as their tax haven.39  Another example is the UK developed country 
where a combination of financial centre which is joined with small islands serve the purpose of tax 
havens. Despite that these islands have a certain degree of independence, still, they are associated 
with the United Kingdom and playing the role of tax havens. Given the fact that these tax havens provide 
financial secrecy to the cross border transactions of TNCs, the Tax Justice Network released their report 
in 2011 which revealed that the highest-ranking country (that was weighed upon its financial secrecy 
with the size of its cross border financial sector) was Switzerland, and the subsequent list holds the 
prominent names of  Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and the United States.40 Though these 
tax havens provide the best support to the TNCs in terms of tax competition and preventing excessive 
taxation on their cross-border transactions, but to the contrary, these tax havens also give them an 
upper edge to downplay the game by bringing threat to the fair economy. The reason being, the other 
countries, when observe the aggressive tax policies of these tax havens, they tend to lower their taxes 
so that they could compete with these tax havens, and this, in turn, gives rise to lower their tax revenues. 
If this trend would continue, then it would be highly likely that no country would be able to adequately 
generate the tax revenues given the fact that countries would not be able to rightly tax these TNCs. The 
final result would be increased taxes on incur debts and labour thereby putting negative effects on 
infrastructure, public services, and social justice. The TNCs get enormous benefits of avoiding taxations 
on their cross-border transactions because these transactions do not involve the transfer of real 
economic activity inside the tax havens jurisdictions, but it shows an activity of shifting on paper so as 
to enjoy the avoidance of taxation. It also gives a competitive disadvantage to the small and medium-
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sized enterprises (SME's) because these tax havens only entertain the big transnational corporations. 
This is surely not a fair and healthy competition at all.  
 
TNCs tax evasion and avoidance figures through tax havens, tax holidays, and 
conduit 
The literature points to the fact that the international banks and the TNCs together make $37 billion 
minimum tax evasion alone in the United States.41 In Germany, there are no tough rules for TNCs to 
provide their reports but a few studies pointed out that the profits reported by the TNCs give an alarming 
gap of €60 to €100 billion on each passing year.42 This shows that how much loss Germany procures 
every year due to TNCs related taxation problems. Another report highlights that the tax havens 
facilitate tax avoidance and TNCs are the number one beneficiary in this regard because they give the 
lowest average tax rate.43 All these figures provide us with a worrisome overview of TNCs related 
taxation avoidance and evasion at large. There is no denying that the economic success of many 
countries is strongly based on favourable tax conditions related areas such as China, but this 
phenomenon also downplays the tax base thereby leaving the countries vulnerable to inadequate tax 
revenues.  
 
As a matter of fact, there are also certain TNCs that are granted “Tax holidays” like the legal TNCs 
which are also called as the holding companies which collect certain assets or financial flows and enjoy 
the preferential tax regimes to conduct their cross-border transactions. Conduit is also an offer available 
in a country which helps the TNCs to channel money through a certain country and reap the advantages 
from the tax rates thereafter. The countries which offer conduit are like Luxemburg, and Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and many more.44 To make this possible, there are some Sink Offshore Financial 
Centres (OFCs) which work to attract and hold foreign capital whereas the Conduit-OFCs serve the 
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purpose of lucrative intermediate destinations which allows the transfer of the capital of TNCs without 
any taxes. 
 
TNCs enjoy these favourable taxation jurisdictions, for instance, in Netherland, it is extremely easy to 
make a company’s registration and get an address which would reflect a real company. It is also 
possible for a company to have very little staff, still, getting engaged in large scale sales. The types of 
tax privileges for holding companies in Switzerland have taken the country on the top spot as the world’s 
biggest TNCs have been using it as a biggest commodity trading location in the world despite that 
Switzerland has almost zero commodities of its own. This shows how the world’s biggest TNCs move 
their money into Switzerland, and when these TNCs extract their money into their own countries, they 
do not give taxation to their home countries.45 Hence, apparently which seems like a real economic 
activity generated by the TNCs in Switzerland, is just the paperwork which does not reflect the economic 
activity in the TNCs home countries. What is more, it is also arguable that if the TNCs main business 
lies in their home countries, then what is the moral and legal validity of Switzerland to gain a large part 
of their profits?  
 
Overview of the International jurisdictions and tax laws to counter TNCs tax avoidance and tax evasion 
practices 
 
The establishment of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)  
The key to tax avoidance and tax evasion related problems is transparency. In this context, tax laws 
and regulations in different jurisdictions require pertinent information on TNCs such as their sales, staff, 
assets, relevant geographic distribution on one side, and their corresponding taxation and payments to 
the governments on the other side. This phenomenon is also termed as country-by-country reporting.46 
This way it is possible to make a comparison of TNC based on their cross-border transactions so as to 
gauge the mismatches between them accordingly. One of the first steps in this regard, at the 
international level, is the establishment of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which 
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allows the global countries to voluntarily sign up so that their transparency could be checked.47 This 
information could be used now to detect the non-taxation cases of TNCs and the corruption cases 
likewise. The EITI actually revealed the Glencore case, for instance, that based on the data obtained 
from comparable mines, Mopani Mine was giving very low taxation.48 Although the knowledge obtained 
from EITI would not stop the taxation issues, still, it would serve as a stepping stone for investigating 
further into the issue.  
 
US Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 has brought in a considerable change to the commodity companies in the 
United States because it compels the companies that they ought to make their governments’ related 
payments published all over the globe. This act was enacted in the United States out of a strong reaction 
to the financial crisis of 2008 which makes the listed companies to be in compliance with publishing 
their tax payments on a project-by-project and country-by-country basis. The criteria of the US Dodd-
Frank Act (2010) was reformed with the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) thereby 
including more detailed reports thereafter. The US Dodd-Frank Act was a concrete measure to tighten 
financial regulations which was focused on business transparency regarding overseas operations. The 
section 1502 in this act compels the TNCs operating in the United States to give reports whether their 
products contain the conflict minerals originating from other countries or from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo.49 But later on, it was reported that in the year 2014, the reports submitted by the companies 
were insufficient which gives credence to the view that the law did not bring adequate results.50 
 
Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rule and the blacklist  
The Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rule is enacted in a bid to curb the tax avoidance strategies 
of TNCs so that they are deterred to accept artificial entities purely for taxation purposes. For instance, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan have implemented this CFC rule in their jurisdictions 
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through which they can tax an entity in another country which is controlled by UK, Japanese, or US 
parent company under certain situations. 51  Of note that this rule is only applied under certain 
circumstances because it directly goes against the approach of “separate entity”. Also, the blacklist 
provides the names of those countries that are harmful, so, if a TNC has a business relationship 
between its parent company and the affiliate companies in any of the blacklisted countries, that TNC 
would be subject to be penalised in return.  
 
Double taxation agreements 
The key aim of the double taxation agreements (DTAs) in the past was to prevent the occurrence of 
double taxation on those companies whose transactions involve cross-border transactions in two 
countries. Both the parent company and the subsidiary company are treated as separate entities by the 
DTAs which depends on the location where the actual business takes place. This separate entity 
approach handles the double taxation by employing two ways 1) either in one of the two signatory 
states, the taxation would be exempted, or the tax paid by the TNC in one state would be credited in 
the other. This implies that the TNC would be taxed only in one state (higher tax country or the lower), 
but the TNC would not be double taxed in both countries. In the context of DTAs, OECD and UN 
modelled important agreements. The model based on the latter one is more inclined towards the 
developing countries. Based on the Arm’s Length Principle, both these DTAs assume that the subsidiary 
of a company, as well as the parent company are composed of separate entities which need to interact 
in the same manner as they interact with the third parties.52 As a matter of fact, these treaties have not 
fully tackled the issue of double taxation on the score that the double taxation issue is now again in the 
limelight.53 This implies that there are still loopholes in the DTAs enacted for the TNCs so far.  
 
Withholding taxes 
When compared with any of the anti-avoidance efforts, the withholding taxes are much more powerful 
which are levied at the tax base source. Withholding taxes are of many types but they all inhibit the 
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process of money shifting so that it is free of any type of taxation thereafter. For instance, it is possible 
that withholding tax is imposed on a TNCs production facility, not on the bases of TNCs profits or losses, 
but on the bases of the staff working there. For instance, municipalities assess and impose taxation on 
the companies which is not based on the revenue of the company.54 It is also a common practice of 
TNCs that they shift their capital gains so as to evade taxes, therefore, withholding taxes could be 
imposed on the TNCs in this regard as well. Withholding taxes are more important for the developing 
countries which host the subsidiaries of the parent companies, but do not host the parent company. So, 
if these subsidiaries are not properly taxed, then the developing countries would not be able to keep a 
fair share of the profits of the TNCs with regards to the subsidiaries hosted there. Additionally, if 
withholding taxes are not imposed on the subsidiary, then it is highly likely that the TNCs parent 
company that is based in a developed country, would secure the tax profits against the revenues. It is 
of note that the withholding taxes are good to make the TNCs compliant to the taxation and preventing 
them from tax evasion and avoidance, still, these taxes are not free of problems. For instance, when 
Germany tried to switch from the capital gains taxes to the withholding taxation so that the banks directly 
deduct the payments from the accounts, Germany experienced a huge tax cut in response coupled with 
the problem of anonymous payments.55 Previously, Germany was able to secure capital gains tax of 
almost 50%, but when the withholding taxes were imposed, the country was only able to secure a 25% 
flat-rate taxation. 
 
Methodology Section 
 
Before this study gets into the details of the methodology part of this dissertation, it would highlight two 
key jurisdictions relevant to the income tax laws and regulation i.e. the United States taxation jurisdiction 
for the TNCs and the European Union (EU) jurisdiction. After giving an overview of these two 
jurisdictions, the dissertation would further investigate the legal treaties, legal frameworks, and 
international legal agreements of taxation laws so as to examine the norms of international legal laws 
with respect to TNCs. This way, the dissertation would be able to analyse and acknowledge to what 
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extent transnational corporations’ tax administration and tax-laws are legitimate and authoritative in the 
globalized world. 
 
It is of note that this study could be considered as a comparative study, but this comparison is not made 
in statistical terms or by comparing different sets of variables as in normal comparative studies5657 
because power (in case of tax administration authorities) and deception (in case of TNCs) could be 
gauged but they cannot be measured exactly in statistical terms.5859 Therefore, the current methodology 
in this dissertation revolves around taking a close look at both sides i.e. from the TNCs side their tax 
evasion and evading strategies, and the tax administration authorities’ side, their strengths and 
weaknesses, and then performing an all-inclusive critical analysis thereby seeking answer to the main 
title i.e. “to what extent transnational corporations’ tax administration and tax-laws are legitimate and 
authoritative in the globalized world”. This way, by identifying the strategies of tax evasion and evading 
strategies by the TNCs first, and then the counter strategies adopted by the tax administration 
authorities (in both US and EU jurisdictions), and then making a holistic opinion by comparing both 
things would reach to a better conclusion thereafter. 
 
The researcher has selected this methodology because both sides of the continuum of taxation can be 
viewed through this methodology without needing a complex set of mathematical calculations. This 
methodology provides a comparative but philosophical investigation to understand the legitimation and 
authority of TNCs in terms of complying with the tax laws and the legitimation and authority of tax 
administration authorities in terms of enforcing these taxation laws in different jurisdictions. Another 
reason for selecting this methodology is to critically review and analyse the taxation problems in the 
globalised world without falling prey to the mathematical jargon which is difficult to understand at large. 
Hence, the structure is feasible and potent enough to bring a hard topic in soft language without needing 
tough academic qualification on the one hand, and it also provides a deep critical investigation into the 
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matter of taxation law that would benefit the tax administration authorities to correctly enact their 
legislations, and is highly likely to inform and guide the TNCs to comply with the taxation laws likewise. 
 
The United States jurisdiction of tax laws and TNCs 
The United States enacted considerable changes in their income tax system in the earlier decades of 
the 20th century. The congress was empowered after the 13th amendment so that regardless of the 
apportionment among different states, they could tax the income. Since then the income taxes have 
been an integral component in the United States taxation system. When comparing the past century 
with the current century, it is reported that corporate tax revenue was 4.4% in 1919, whereas in 2009, 
it was reported only 1.3% of GDP.60 The key motivation in the early century was to regulate corporations 
and these corporations were given more incentives during those days.61 Also, there was no corporation 
with the issue of double taxation on the score that the net earnings and the dividends of the corporate 
income were deductible from the personal tax income. When it comes to minutely analyzing the US 
taxation for TNCs, it is observed that the United States is losing the steam in the sense that the key US 
TNCs that are operating across the borders are facing challenges by the emerging companies. To 
minimize their expenses overseas, the US TNCs are trying to minimize their operational costs to the 
limits. In this situation, the tax rates play a vital role in terms of making or breaking the economy through 
properly regulating the big TNCs giving them leverages, incentives, and opportunities so that they base 
their headquarters in the US territory. As a matter of fact, the tax rate on TNCs is highest among the 
OECD members.62 It is worth noting that even the individual US States are highly competing against 
each other in a bid to offer lower income tax to the TNCs and attract their investments likewise. This 
way the US States try to gain the confidence of TNCs by offering them lower tax rates. This implies that 
there is no single tax rate in the United States being country as a whole. At the same time, due to 
globalisation and competition around the globe, and the fact that TNCs are trying their best to avoid 
and evade taxes globally, the United States government is also imposing new tax codes on TNCs so 
that the tax gap could be closed. As a result, in the US jurisdictions, the TNCs are less aggressive in 
planning their taxes as compared to the past. The reason being, TNCs have realized that tax avoidance 
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and evasion is associated with reputational risk, so, their Uncertain Tax Position (UTP) will be audited 
because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States has been given extensive powers that 
they could easily challenge the aggressive tax position taken by the TNCs.63 This is regarded as one of 
the biggest changes in US taxation administration system in the year 2010 wherein the TNCs are 
obligated to disclose a tax issue to the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Similarly, the US 
taxation system also imposed a regulation with regards to IRS powers wherein TNCs need to disclose 
their specific transactions to IRS thereby giving IRS more powers to highlight tax shelters and to 
challenge those TNC transactions that are illegal or based on tax avoidance strategies. Furthermore, 
the US taxation system also allows the IRS to ask for Tax Accrual Work Papers (TAWs) of the TNC if 
the TNC is involved in some doubtful listed transactions, and the TAWs are referred to as one of the 
highly secretive documents which hold the sensitive analysis for diverse tax positions, tax opinions, and 
the list of tax reserves.64 These strict taxation laws give credence to the view that the TNCs might like 
to reconsider or change their aggressive tax positions. Also, the Internal Revenue Code obligates the 
TNCs to publish penalties pertaining to tax in their annual report. 
 
The US Whistleblower Program 
Also, the tax legislation regarding the Whistleblower program which encourages people to report IRS if 
they find any illegal taxation activity is in the limelight. By pointing out the illegal taxation activity, the 
individuals would be granted a reward of 15% to 30% based on the additional collection of tax by the 
government.65 The figures show that the IRS awarded $104 million in the year 2012 to the whistleblower 
program so that the US citizens move ahead to disclose tax-evading practices in the United States. The 
SEC paid the reward of $14 million to a whistleblower because he reported a fraudulent scheme. The 
whistleblowers have been awarded $211 million during the years 2009 to 2013 because IRS was able 
to collect $1.7 billion additional taxes in the wake of whistleblower reporting.66  
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Principle of economic substance and business purpose  
In the year 2010, the United States also enacted the “Principle of economic substance and business 
purpose” based on which the TNCs are obligated to divulge their transactions which are lacking the 
economic substance.67 Thereafter, the TNCs also stay alert to pay better attention to whether their 
transactions have business and economic substance in compliance with the legislation. 
 
The tax authorities in the United States which administer the tax positions of companies rarely used to 
challenge the aggressive tax positions of TNCs prior to 2000, therefore, the private investigations kept 
public unaware of the taxation frauds during those times. But after 2000, the TNCs became vulnerable 
to reputation risk on the score that several open investigations against many large auditing and 
accounting companies such as KPMG, Ernst & Young, Enron made public aware of the fraudulent 
activities regarding the tax shelters participation of these huge companies.68 Prior to the period 2000, 
the main tax optimization strategy for TNCs in the United States was to reduce the effective tax rates 
(ETRs) because there were no strict rules and regulations by the tax administration authorities. The 
TNCs were using tax shelters on a daily routine. Suppose if any TNC gets caught up in fraudulent 
activity regarding the taxation, the tax authorities used to give it a lenient punishment secretly thereby 
such activities rarely unfold before the public. But the TNCs taxation landscape has been completely 
changed in favour of the tax administration authorities after 2000. The new laws and legislation 
described above reduced the TNCs ability to execute aggressive tax planning and tax positions likewise.  
 
There could be many signs of tax aggressiveness examined by the tax administration authorities. For 
example, if the overall ETR of the TNC is low then it might point to the aggressive tax position of the 
TNC. The general formula of ETR calculation is the total income tax expense that is to be divided by 
the pre-tax income worldwide. But as a matter of fact, this figure could go against the GAAP which says 
that the foreign earnings must be taxed unless the TNC proves that their earnings are again invested 
for an indefinite time period.69 One of the key examples in this regard is the lowest ETRs displayed by 
Apple Company, which definitely shows its aggressive tax positions in the countries with low tax 
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jurisdiction. The reason being, Apple takes the stance that they reinvest half of their earnings for an 
indefinite period of time.  
 
The US tax administration authorities should make improvements in the IRS whistleblower program so 
that maximum cases against the TNCs aggressive tax positions could be materialised. It is reported 
that there were 2300 whistleblowers claims in the year 2007, but only 9 were materialised.70 This vividly 
shows that IRS might have not enough resources to investigate all of the serious claims or it might be 
possible that they could not find enough legal evidence so as to file a suit to the TNC. Similarly, there 
is a long delay reported in paying the whistleblowers which should also be improved so that the 
informers might not get exhausted in the process. All the above-mentioned issues should be addressed 
so that the United States tax authorities are able to derive full benefits of the program in the long run.  
 
Tax legislation and tax administration in the United States on TNCs foreign 
earnings (The Trapped Cash Scenario)  
As a matter of fact, the high corporate taxation in the United States forces TNCs to leave the highest 
amount of their foreign earnings abroad in the low tax jurisdictions. The same might be the reason that 
TNCs reinvest huge amount of their earnings to be indefinitely reinvested in the foreign countries. It is 
also observed that this is drastic for the US-based TNCs on the score that these foreign earnings are 
not invested in the instruments that can revive innovation in the TNC itself because these foreign 
earnings are normally invested in stocks and securities. This implies that only a fraction of their profits 
would be invested in the research and development thereby lacking their competitive edge which is the 
key requirement for a company to stay competitive in the era of globalisation. In this regard, the US 
TNCs “trapped cash” scenario is worth noting which reflects the liquid investments and money that the 
subsidiary possess outside the jurisdiction of the home country.71 The TNC do not bring their foreign 
earnings at home for the reason that their earnings would be subject to the corporate taxation of 35% 
minus the credit that the company has paid for foreign income taxes. It is reported that during the past 
years, the magnitude of foreign earnings of US-based TNCs has hit the roof. In the year 2012, $1.2 
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trillion untaxed profits of 70 US-based TNCs were scattered all over the world that is 18.4% when 
compared with the past year.72 When the US tax Technical Director at FASB was asked the question 
of low deferred US income taxes on the said topic and why the TNCs are not paying taxes on their 
foreign earnings, she pointed towards the FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 740, 
Income taxes in the following lines: 
“It shall be presumed that all undistributed earnings of a subsidiary will be 
transferred to the parent entity (740-30-25-3) unless sufficient evidence shows that the subsidiary has 
invested or will invest the undistributed earnings indefinitely (740-30-25-17).” 
 
In the wake of constant growth in these foreign cash situations, the US-based TNCs become vulnerable 
to the risk of lacking competitive advantage, the risk of liquidity in domestic operations, and the risk of 
low cash required for research and development. In this regard, there should be amendments in the 
repatriation legislature so that the TNCs are given worthy incentives so that they are allowed to release 
a portion of their foreign trapped earnings to the parent company based in the United States. Nowadays, 
when the TNCs experience short of funds then they feel disadvantaged and they are compelled to 
repatriate their foreign earnings even in the presence of highly unsuited corporate income tax thereby 
giving a blow to the competition.  
 
Legislation of TNCs corporate tax inversion in the United States 
 
American Job Creation Act (AJCA) 2004 to stop inversions  
It is observed that many TNCs based in the United States try to get away with the worldwide strict 
regulation pertaining to the taxation which includes but not limited to US corporate taxation as well. In 
this context, the TNCs are practising the “tax inversion” which reflects when they change their home 
country by purchasing a foreign company that is based outside the US in a low tax jurisdiction but at 
least with a size of 25% of the US company.73 In this type of inversion, there is no major shift in the 
headquarter, management, or ownership of the corporation. Normally the top executives are retained 
at home whilst the company’s legal address is shifted overseas. Clothier argues that in many senses, 
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tax inversion has many loopholes, still, it is not referred to as tax evasion because it still falls within the 
domain of tax laws.74 As a matter fact, when a TNC avails the facility of inversion, it is not taken as a 
US corporation, and consequently, the TNC would not pay any taxes on the profits that it earned 
overseas. The democrats make legislation so that the TNCs remain in the United States and they intend 
to penalize those TNCs who avail the tax inversion whereas the Republicans are of the view that the 
tax rates should be lowered so that the TNCs do not leave their home country.75 Burger King is one of 
those companies who merged with a Canadian company named Time Hortons with $11.5 billion in the 
year 2014. After the big merger, Burger King lost its occurrence as a US-based company. Even the US 
government did not like it because Burger King was avoiding the taxes but could not do anything.  
 
Various types of tax legislation were enacted in the past with a key focus of tackling the inversion issue 
in the United States. For instance, the American Job Creation Act (AJCA) was enacted in the year 2004 
and a new section was included in the IRC based on which the corporations could avail the inversions 
if they own at the very least 80% assets of the new company. Secondly, the company’s new 
headquarters must take charge of the active operations which deterred the companies to avail inversion 
because this way they had to build new headquarters in the foreign country rather than the practice in 
which they just do the paperwork and actively operate from within the United States. Section 965 in 
AJCA also encouraged the TNCs to avail one-time tax holiday provided if they repatriate their foreign 
profits at the rate of just 5.2% instead of 35%. Nevertheless, it failed to attract most of the TNCs because 
out of 9700 TNCs, only 843 availed the facility. 
 
Even the Obama administration proposed in 2014 and 2016 to permanently close the loophole of tax 
inversion through tough legislation. Despite the proposal, congress did not take any tough action, but 
merely reduced the benefits of inversion.76 However, a legislation was put in place to inhibit serial 
inversions practice in which, upon availing the inversion facility, the TNC intends to own another US 
company. Although these legislations were put in place to deter TNCs inversions, they did not deter 
many TNCs at large.  
 
                                                 
74 SL Clothier, ‘Relationships Between Corporate Inversions and The Tax Cuts & Jobs Act’ (2019) 2. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid 62. 
32 
 
It was also observed that the TNCs started to accumulate foreign earnings and then opt the wait and 
watch policy to see when another tax holiday would be passed by the United States so that they avail 
the facility thereafter. This implies that TNCs were able to avoid taxes by carefully planning their taxation 
strategies. The following table illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Corporate 
Tax system in general.77 
Strengths Weaknesses 
When compared with other developed 
nations, the effective tax rates are 
comparatively the same. 
The statuary tax rate of the united states is 
higher when compared with other 
developed nations. 
The tax savings are likely to prevail the 
non-tax considerations such as developed 
financial system, infrastructure, and 
labour force. 
The corporate tax system needs to be 
updated. 
Despite the high tax rate, the revenue is 
steady. 
The foreign earnings of the TNCs are 
subjected to the corporate tax. 
 Considerable administration cost incurred 
due to sophisticated corporate US tax code 
 Still, the loopholes of corporate tax 
inversions are present in the system. 
 Aggressive tax positions are subjected to 
stricter regulations in response.  
 There are many exemptions in corporate tax 
legislation due to lobbying.  
 
 
The European Union (EU) jurisdiction of tax laws and TNCs 
As a matter of fact, diverse types of disputes arise that are counterproductive to both TNCs, as well as 
the tax administration authorities due to the coexistence of diverse types of tax systems between the 
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EU countries. In the context of the EU, it is proposed that the tax harmonisation among the nations 
should be increased so as to approximate the tax systems among the nations. The core aim is to make 
EU states a single market where all member states are subjected to a coherent system of taxation. 
Harmonising the rates of corporate taxes is one of the key agendas of EU tax administration.78 
 
The Ruding Report 
The former finance minister of Netherlands Dr. Onno Ruding was appointed so that relevant 
harmonisation could be devised among the member states. However, the report completely supported 
the division of TNCs income on the basis of arm’s length principle thereby favouring the status quo in 
general. In a nutshell, the Ruding Report did not achieve its harmonisation objectives. It is observed 
that the major obstacle to reach a consensus for tax harmonisation among the EU member states is 
the requirement that for any corporate related tax reform, all the member states must give a unanimous 
agreement. 
 
Improving procedures pertaining to information exchange  
As a matter of fact, due to the absence of relevant information, it is hard to figure out the parameters of 
a comparable transaction. Also, the TNCs operate in certain jurisdictions, therefore, the tax authorities 
cannot obtain all the relevant information of their transactions. Not only the TNCs normally hold that 
information overseas, but the legislation of bank secrecy laws also prohibits the tax administration 
authorities to gain access to specific information about TNCs. In this regard, the OECD issued a new 
report on this question so that all the member states give their consensus accordingly.79 But as a matter 
of fact, there is a limiting factor in such information exchange between EU member states i.e. only that 
information which is deemed necessary under the provision of Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) would 
allow the authorities to conduct the information exchange.  
 
At EU level, tax harmonisation in TNCs is slow 
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When it comes to organising and optimising the taxation within integrated European Union, the process 
is slow on the score that many radical tax proposals in the past were rejected during the 1980s, and 
approach was adopted by the tax administration authorities that was more focused on subsidiarity.80 
But as a matter of fact, the direct taxation among the member states remained slow at large. In the early 
1990s, the European Commission started negotiations among all the EU states, but those negotiations 
took a slow pace. Although the “secretive Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation” formulates 
high-level technical discussions in a bid to examine and discuss national tax legislation among member 
states, still, there are reports that some member states are striving to jointly block efforts against the 
tax evasion and tax avoidance.81 All in all, the attempts to successfully make all the member states in 
compliance with a single tax harmonised tax policy have been failed. This might be due to the fact that 
there has never been a total consensus among all member states on a uniform taxation policy for the 
TNCs. It is argued that there might be valid reasons behind this failure of unanimous consensus among 
member states. For instance, some member states might see tax competition as a positive factor, and 
not a negative one, and there could be some sort of disadvantages of locations which a few member 
states might want some compensation. It might also because a few member states see tax 
harmonisation and information exchange as a hard blow to their sovereignty.82   
 
Also, there is a long list of issues which policymakers face in the EU, for instance, information and time 
is limited that is why they are forced to pick only certain types of severe problems and the outcomes of 
the decision-makers are somewhat ambiguous on the score that they only use some trusted sources 
to pluck out the desired information. Due to all this, there is always the element of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in their decisions.83 Secondly, when a proposal is handed over to the EU policy process, it is 
bound to take over much time and efforts for the fact that it has to be discussed by a range of institutions. 
Conflicts arise on a regular basis due to the undefined and multifaceted preferences of the member 
states. All in all, this situation equates to a messy and uncertain policy process. 
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Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)  
The 2011 CCCTB was created in a bid to tackle the problems relevant with the corporate taxation and 
CCCTB argues that due to diverse range of tax regimes in different EU member states, there are risks 
and uncertainties in market conditions due to high compliance and administrative costs coupled with 
the risk of double taxation for those TNCs which are operating in multiple member states. The CCCTB 
intends to create a framework for the EU so that all the obstacles pertaining to taxes are removed and 
EU member states get involved in healthy competition likewise.84 The 2011 “Proposal for a Council 
directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposed that the TNC would be 
allowed to file one tax return against their complete activities in the EU member states. It was also 
proposed that the TNCs can either avail the CCCTB proposed tax system which requires the TNC to 
hold EU-based activities, or the TNC can continue to utilise the parallel corporate tax systems currently 
subsist within the member states. This flared up criticism against the said proposal because it gives an 
unfair chance to the TNCs whether they opt for a new tax system proposed by CCCTB or they continue 
utilising their old tax systems based on their personal requirements and preferences. Also, this duality 
equates to an increase in the administrative cost of most of the EU member states. It is also argued 
that only including the EU-based activities in the proposal provides TNCs with an opportunity to shift 
their profits outside the jurisdiction of the European Union.85 However, the system aims to access the 
past 6 years data so as to restrict the TNCs related manipulation in taxation and this is considered as 
the very first consolidated attempt to harmonise all the EU member states corporate tax base.86 A few 
member states such as Germany and France have been strong supporter of the 2011 “Proposal for a 
Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), whereas a few member 
states remained strong opponents of the said proposal such as UK, Netherlands, Luxemburg, and 
Ireland because they are of the view that this tax base harmonisation is in reality, a slippery slope 
towards the harmonisation of the tax rate among all member states.  
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The Tax Justice campaigners and the policy level variance in member states put pressure on the 
member states so that they tackle the TNCs tax avoidance strategies by conforming to the CCCTB 
proposed policies. The world also witnessed the 2008 global financial crises, and the publications of 
many researchers amplified the debate that the TNCs tax avoidance and tax evasion give rise to global 
financial inequality.87 Despite the proposal and all the efforts, the world witnessed the biggest MNCs 
scandals of tax avoidance and tax evasion, for example, Starbucks scandal augmented the same 
debate of tax avoidance since Starbucks was paying no taxes against their UK profits. The world also 
came across various secret deals between the TNCs and the Luxembourg tax authority commonly 
known as “LuxLeaks”.88 The latest 2016 proposal of CCCTB is also on the top-slot, still, the TNCs are 
trying to leverage from the loopholes in the proposal with a focus on tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
 
Critical analysis/Discussion regarding the legitimacy and authority of tax administration and tax 
laws of transnational corporations 
 
Overview and background of Transnational Legal Order for TNCs  
There is an abundance of literature stuff on the topic of transnational corporations’ law with respect to 
the international law. In the context of tax law, during the past years, a new term “transnational legal 
order” is also coined in the backdrop of international tax.89 It is a common phenomenon that tax laws 
are imposed by the legislative authorities for the betterment of public goods and national sovereignty. 
But the question remains, is there a single applicable law in the world for transnational corporations, 
and suppose if it exists, then what is its legitimacy and authority in the global world. How this law is 
comprehended and enacted in the international domains and is it a practising law or just written in law 
studies to fill the word count? This section is going to deeply analyse these questions so as to fill the 
void of unanswered questions, and to analyse the legitimacy and authority of tax administration and tax 
laws of transnational corporations in reality.  
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The concept of Transnational law is not a new phenomenon in the current century because it was also 
coined many decades ago by Philip Jessup who presented a narrower concept of transnational law in 
1956 wherein he only presented the relationship between one state and the other state because the 
only subject of law during those days was nation-states.90 As a matter of fact, the nations, during those 
times were getting involved in a broad range of treaties in a bid to get away with double taxation. The 
key agenda of cooperation among different states during those days was the development of tax norms 
and pursuing nations to participate in international cooperation in taxation. It was also observed that the 
countries were reluctant to broadly cooperate in the transnational law because they deem it as a matter 
of sovereignty, therefore, allocation of taxation rights in the transnational tax sphere was recognised as 
a necessity at large, still, there was minimal cooperation from the countries. Yet today, the same agenda 
is in the air in full swing where the world is demanding the TNCs to pay their fair share of taxes to the 
states for so many reasons. For instance, when the TNCs do not pay their taxes, then the tax burden 
is directed towards individual taxpayers which also triggers global inequality among the rich and the 
poor countries at large. The world needs a flexible, yet hard formulation of law and jurisdiction in the 
international sphere.  
 
This corroborates the importance of the selected topic for this dissertation i.e. finding the answer “to 
what extent transnational corporations’ tax administration and tax-laws are legitimate and authoritative 
in the globalized world”. The researcher chose this topic because it directly affects the general citizens 
in different jurisdictions. If the TNCs would continue to toy with tax legislation and keep on manipulating 
through tax loopholes, then the governments in different jurisdictions would be deprived of their right to 
collecting funds which they require to spend to facilitate the general public at large. Secondly, the 
chosen structure and comparative study-based methodology is also employed with the simplest of 
structure but in-depth thinking scope so that general public in addition to professional law authorities as 
well as the TNCs come to understand the basic ills of taxation in different jurisdictions and play their 
positive role in terms of tax compliance. Furthermore, this study would positively contribute to improving 
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the tax legislation scenarios so that every country gets a fair share of their taxation against the worthy 
services they provide to the TNCs. 
 
When it comes to analysing TNCs, one could not help imagining the expanding scale of human’s cross 
border interactions, and this scenario gives a call to find answers that what power or degree, the national 
and international law should be applied to those huge TNCs. In the past, states were only having the 
hard laws such as the statutes or treaties which were formulated and enacted by the authorities, and 
the hard law ensures a hard obligation between states and the law would be exactly worded with exact 
obligations undertaken.91 To the contrary, if a law is made for attaining general goals, it is not authorised 
by courts or treaties, but it could be enforced by non-state actors be it non-government businesses and 
organisations such as global accounting standards or international institutions such as OECD, then it 
would be termed as “soft law”.  
 
When the transnational legal order was formulated in the past century, the main aim was to get relief 
from “double taxation” thereby giving tax relief to the TNCs. By allocating the jurisdiction of residence, 
the TNCs were endowed the double taxation relief on the one hand, but inadvertently, it acted as a 
catalyst to imbalance the tax competition. The reason being, it gave the TNCs to take leverage from 
legal options so as to reduce their tax bills and left the nations vulnerable to aggressive low-tax 
strategies opted by the TNCs. Afterwards, that double taxation based legal transnational order was 
modified in the wake of the issues pertaining to tax avoidance and evasion, but in reality, the 
modifications have not found full-fledged success so far. According to Genschel and Rixen, it is not 
possible to tackle both double taxation and tax competition without sacrificing the sovereignty 
internationally. 92  That is to say, the governments need to sacrifice either revenue sovereignty, 
administrative sovereignty, or legal sovereignty so as to deal with the double taxation and tax 
competition things. The reason being, the states or countries are different from one another, but they 
seek to regulate the TNCs which are mobile in the global market which makes legal orders as 
interdependent and overlapping among different states thereby leaving states’ sovereignty at stake in 
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some way or the other. In this context, it becomes extremely hard to measure the distribution of power 
among different states and the legitimacy and authority of the tax administration authorities likewise. 
 
The authority of the state as a tax collector in this globalised era of Transnational 
law 
The authority of the state is relevant to its particular jurisdiction because the state needs the capability 
and power to collect tax effectively, and this role of the state is deemed essential to the notion of the 
statehood. The inevitability of taxation for the success of the state and constitution was well coined by 
Adam Smith in the year 1776.93 He says that alone the steady revenue is capable enough to give dignity 
and security to the government, therefore, there should be fairness, efficiency, and certainty in taxation. 
It is also argued that the capacity of the state depends upon its capacity to tax.94 But this capacity, in 
the current century, is diverted to the elected legislators that are constrained within the constitutional 
frameworks of their country. This capacity of the statehood could be seen within the state boundaries, 
but when it comes to analysing this power outside their borders in shape of Transnational tax law for 
TNCs, no state has ever been completely bound or secure by the international tax administration bodies 
thereby international taxation is turned out to be “performative” or “operative”.95 The new actors and 
processes are continuously being involved in the process of shaping the transnational tax law.  
 
In this globalisation era, we know that various worldly institutions and banks are connected with each 
other through up-to-the-minute technology because they have shifted their prospects from national to 
transnational institutions all across the globe. The banking card which is created by a South African 
bank can also take out money from the ATM machine in the US, or in many other global countries. This 
implies that we might have to think beyond the concepts of “source” and “residence” in the transnational 
law likewise because the tax jurisdictions should be based on one construct that must be explained as 
a “world society”. It is true that global is not separate from the national because it is deeply embedded 
inside the nation-state. The problem of state authority and power begins when the global transnational 
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law takes a shift of authority from global to national because, at that point in time, worrying implications 
arise underlying the national tax state for the legitimate fiscal bargain of the country.  
 
Should transnational tax jurisdiction be territorially confined?  
This is what Jessup observed in the first place because the tax laws in the past centuries were mostly 
associated with territorial concepts which include the location of property, contracts, or activities. In this 
regard, Jessup opines that the jurisdictions of tax should not be confined on the basis of territory.96 
Jessup says that this is just a rule of convenience, not a necessity. The territorial jurisdictions are applied 
to the tax law because the government’s ability to collect tax applies on those who can be taxed and 
who lie within their jurisdictions, and the tax authority can exert its powers upon them. In most countries, 
the tax authorities and the governments determine this by the concept of “residency”. The concept of 
“residence”, when applied to individuals, it reflects the place where the person takes residence, a place 
or domicile, or the location from where the person comes from, or simply the place where the person 
resides for 6+ months of a year. Even in the United States, the concept of “residence” is applied so that 
the government can impose taxes on the citizens based on the said criteria.  
 
This old concept of “residence” might need an extension transnationally. Would it be feasible that for 
the current era of technology that the same old locatable position of a taxpayer is used? This is not a 
totally new phenomenon in the tax law jurisdictions. This concept is also extended in the current national 
income tax laws wherein the concept of individual is extended to the investments of offshore entities of 
those persons who are still resident of a particular country, yet the individuals were able to successfully 
extend their presence transnationally beyond the jurisdictions of the country they were residing in. The 
taxation law explains it as an expression of offshore income or the worldwide income, or transnationally, 
one can explain it as worldwide profitability of TNCs.97 If an individual is able to extend his income 
internationally, then the concept of individual residence could be extended to transnational individual 
as well.  
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The legitimacy and effectivity of transnational tax administration authorities  
The success of the national tax rules, as well as the transnational law which has a primary focus on 
capturing the evaded income, depends on what is and how much effective is the taxing power of the 
tax administration authorities. The past 20th century was very good for the statehood of the tax state, 
but it also uplifted the tax havens which was very secret topic until recently.98 This implies that the 
extension of individual’s jurisdiction over the subject of tax needs solid transnational enforcement 
imposed by the tax administration authorities. Hence, the tax administration authorities are paying 
almost all of their attention to the beneficial ownership of offshore trusts, opaque funds, and nominee 
companies in the tax havens to ascertain that the residence tax is not evaded by the actual residents. 
By taking a close look at the United States in the backdrop of these tax efforts, it is observed that these 
efforts are facing strong resistance within the United States, and it is extremely hard to chase the layers 
of beneficial ownership through tax information exchange thanks to the fast-paced tax information 
exchange but very slow efforts with regards to chasing the layers of beneficial ownership. This is where 
the enforcement of transnational tax administration comes handy (we will discuss it more below) 
because it might address those issues clearly, as well as address the double taxation and the double 
non-taxation issues. It is also possible that the legitimacy and effectivity of transnational tax 
administration authorities might give a hard blow to the tax havens sovereignty thereby substantially 
reconfiguring the tax jurisdictions authority into the areas where tax havens are located around the 
globe.  
 
The effectivity of the transnational tax administration authorities might be strengthened if they do not 
track individuals merely on the basis that they are resident or non-resident, rather if they track the 
individuals on the grounds of their transnational movements. Why is that individuals or TNC who get 
benefits from the state from public goods and services, still the state is unable to tax them merely 
because they are non-resident, and that is why the state cannot enjoy the right or jurisdiction to tax. 
This implies that if the transnational tax law is implemented as a whole, then the mobile individuals who 
are travelling across borders and TNCs which are conducting cross-border transactions both would 
come under the strong surveillance of transnational tax administration authorities. One bad proxy to this 
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problem is proposed by using “citizenship” as a ground for taxation, and the United States is 
exceptionally doing this practice. But this option is not recommended because researchers argue that 
citizenship taxation is producing unfair results for those US citizens who are non-resident.99 100  
 
How Australian income tax authorities administer tax from transnational students 
(an example worth noting in the context of transnational tax administration) 
Another example of transnational tax collection could be given in the backdrop of higher education debt 
for former students in many countries. In Australia, the students are the beneficiaries of the government 
funding that is why the students owe money to the government even if they exit Australian 
jurisdictions.101 Similarly, the tertiary education in the United States is also funded by private loans or 
the government and the students still owe them even if they go beyond US jurisdictions. It is also a 
heated debate that in reality, the collection from these students is still a crisis102 due to the difficulty of 
cross border enforcements, still, the law is there which is enforceable on those students (or one could 
not help saying, transnational students). As per the Australian HECS regime, the Australian students 
are eligible to avail the government loan to pay their tertiary education fees. Afterwards, the tax 
authorities i.e. the Australian Tax Office administers the HECS levy on these students which starts at a 
certain income threshold each year. If the students’ income falls below that threshold, the Australian 
Tax Office will not charge the income tax. In the past, if the former students leave Australian jurisdiction 
and become resident of some other country, then due to the income tax concept based on the residence 
of the taxpayer, Australian Tax Office could not apply a levy to those students. However, the Australian 
tax administration authorities have changed this law recently, due to which, the HECS levy will be 
applicable to overseas Australian students based on their worldwide income of the non-resident 
individual.103 This is a kind of transnational legal effect on overseas Australian students. It is of note that 
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100 Allison Christians, 'Uncle Sam Wants Who? A Global Perspective on Citizenship Taxation' (2016) 
Much J Int'l L 193. 
101 Alex McKinnon, 'To Fix America’s Student-Loan Crisis, Look for Inspiration Down Under' (Quartz, 
2017). 
102 Robert Kelchen, 'Is Student Loan Debt Really A Crisis?' (The Conversation, 2015). 
103 'Overseas obligations when repaying loans' (Australian Taxation Office, 2019). 
43 
 
the levy on those students is associated with their ability to pay. Also, the Australian government might 
not be eligible to apply levy to the overseas students in the United States because based on US law, 
foreign tax credit cannot be applied to their residents, but as a matter of fact, Australia could settle this 
by defining it as loan repayment, and not an income tax collection.  
 
Regarding the concept of transnational taxing jurisdiction, the “brain drain” tax is also worth noting.104 
In this regard, Johnstone highlights that according to Chapman et al. if a student completes his tertiary 
education in a poor country, and then he migrates to a developed country like Australia, then the 
Australian government can collect the “Brain drain” tax which would be then remitted to the poor country 
from where the student migrated to Australia. Obviously, this would need cooperation among 
governments globally. 
 
When it comes to transnational corporations related tax administration, the TNCs are able to manipulate 
their locations as well as their allocated income tax by smartly utilising the low tax jurisdictions. The 
corporate tax is basically enforced so as to bring the ultimate owners or shareholders of the TNCs under 
tax net which is linked with the net gains from their investments. But given the facts stated above in this 
dissertation, the loopholes in the taxation laws, the problems of taxing the TNCs across continental 
boundaries, and the smart tactics of TNCs, there has been a constant tension that how and to what 
extent the TNC, as well as their location, will be marked or unmarked by the tax authorities at large. 
The TNCs are able to take leverage from nationally based concepts of the “resident” and they are able 
to subdivide their single TNC company into specialised and multiple sub-entities thereby allowing their 
large corporation to enjoy diverse relationships and rights across the low and high tax jurisdictions. This 
situation becomes extremely complex because taxing a single TNC is one thing, but taxing hundreds 
of paper-based legal entities that are also associated with a diverse range of other legal taxation rules 
especially intellectual property across varying jurisdictions is another thing. This complexity also puts a 
question mark on the authority and rights of tax administration authorities as well as the states 
themselves. As a matter of fact, the intellectual property structures and tax-free jurisdictions have been 
absorbed and marked as capital by the TNCs. This has created a private zone of TNCs capital flow 
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wherein TNCs have become the sole bearers of rights, therefore, the whole situation is directly 
undermining the authority of tax administrators. 
 
Just like the Australian government has legitimised the HECS law to impose a levy on offshore students 
based on their income threshold in a foreign country, the TNCs could be followed by a “look thru” or 
“consolidation” approach, which the world can see in terms of the US regulations in its Controlled 
Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules. But CFC rules also have their own limitations because the CFC rules 
widely diverge from each other since they give strength to only some kinds of income in some 
jurisdictions for some kinds of taxpayers. For example, even US CFC rules allow TNCs to accumulate 
overseas profits in tax havens. 
 
The contribution of BEPS coherent tax law-making to strengthen the international 
tax administration for TNCs 
There are a few treaties and international agreements which are offering new ways to tackle the TNC 
tax problems so that the tax authorities become more effective than in the past. In this context, the 
Multilateral Instrument (MI) is worth noting wherein those TNCs which join this tax law, would be 
considered a member of the new framework, and their existing treaties would be considered null and 
void, all with a key focus to regularise the future development of transnational taxation on the one hand 
and strengthening the tax administration authorities on the other hand.  The MI law states the following 
lines in particular: 
 
the negotiation of the multilateral instrument should include implementation of the tax treaty provisions 
on hybrid entities adopted during the course of the work on Action 2, the work to prevent treaty abuse 
under Action 6, the work to prevent the artificial avoidance of the PE standard under Action 7, the work 
to improve dispute resolution under Action 14, and any other treaty modifications developed during the 
course of the work on the remaining BEPS action items.105 
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This is believed to be a good tax law-making that is aimed at establishing a new set of standards to 
prevent double non-taxation occurrences for TNCs, and a process to encourage the single tax principle 
so that tax administration authorities are strengthened in various TNCs situations. If one takes a close 
look at the various Actions explained in this law, it provides a key focus in providing coherence in TNCs 
tax laws by tackling most of the irregularities in terms of TNCs tax avoidance and evasion. For instance, 
Action 2 relates to hybrid mismatching arrangements, Action 3 is concerned with CFC rules 
strengthening scenarios, Action 4 is relevant to controlling base erosion through financial payments and 
interest deductions. Action 5 relates to effectively tackling harmful tax practices. These types of tax law-
making require a certain degree of international consensus so that the results could be achieved as per 
expectations.  
 
The BEPS Action 5 relates to the harmful tax practices and it has the capacity to end the double non-
taxation plus it addresses the proposal to develop processes to determine disclosure requirements, 
intra country information exchange and transparency between OECD member states, and the 
corresponding rulings for taxpayers. At the same time, by reading the tax law, it is observed that OECD 
is extra careful to describe this Action 5 as follows: 
 
Is not intended to promote the harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures generally within or 
outside the OECD, nor is it about dictating to any country what should be the appropriate level of tax 
rates.106 
 
The BEPS law also points toward the minimum requirement of economic substance which is relevant 
to examining the “real” business under the garb of a single TNC or company. This is pertinent because 
TNCs get involved in making numerous subsidiaries which hamper to draw jurisdictional tax boundaries 
against their cross-border operations. In this regard, the key mantra of BEPS is to tax the profits of 
TNCs based on the fact where is the economic activity took place and the subsequent creation of value 
occurred. The BEPS law states: 
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 Action Item 5 specifically requires substantial activity for any preferential regime. ... this requirement 
contributes to the second pillar of the BEPS project, which is to align taxation with substance by ensuring 
that taxable profits can no longer be artificially shifted away from the countries where value is created.107 
 
What should be the key focus of tax administration authorities? 
As explained earlier, most of the tax legislation in the past presumed that the TNC, taxpayer, or activity, 
can be fixed to a certain physical space or territory in order to tax them correctly. Nevertheless, there 
could be a possibility that the territorial concept of physical space might be fundamentally changed 
altogether in this era of the digital economy. This is where BEPS laws should focus these days so as 
to strengthen the tax administration authorities against possible tax avoidance and tax evasion 
strategies. For example, if the tax administration authorities keep on tracking the TNCs taxes on the 
basis of their physical spaces, then how would they track the economic gains that are earned by those 
TNCs partnered in the trading of virtual online gaming business. Who would they track, the gamer 
location, the location of the other gamers who are playing across continental boundaries, or the location 
of the servers or the IPs? Also, every TNC operates uniquely internally as well, therefore, the physical 
jurisdiction is becoming less viable. 
 
It seems like the governments are trying their best to achieve networked connected transnational tax 
administration systems in this era of globalisation. It is also argued that globalisation is perceived as a 
threat to national sovereignty, but the cross-border technologies of regulation might amplify the power 
of state as well as the state’s capability to govern.108 The researcher does not agree with the notion that 
states are surrendering their tax sovereignty (as per the arguments put forth by Genschel and Rixen)109, 
the researcher sees it as more empowering the tax administration authorities participating in many 
countries as a whole. 
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One of the key laws to strengthen the tax administration authorities is the Multilateral Convention under 
the umbrella of Global Forum, G20, and OECD, wherein many world states are participating in the 
purpose of Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAC). The ambitious scope of MAC is 
written in the Explanatory Report as follows: 
 
This instrument is framed so as to provide for all possible forms of administrative co-operation between 
States in the assessment and collection of taxes, in particular with a view to combating tax avoidance 
and evasion. This co-operation ranges from exchange of information to the recovery of foreign tax 
claims.110 This framework could be used to strengthen the tax administration of TNCs.  
 
The Explanatory Report also suggests that there should be speedy and direct contacts between tax 
administrations between states to make the tax administration assistance more effective than ever. The 
MAC also recommends that the tax administration of TNCs is gaining power due to automatic data 
sharing through fast technological systems. It is of note that MAC does not have any authority to 
implement automatic data exchange between the states, but it emphasises to make a mutual agreement 
among countries that what kind of processes and information would be included in such information 
exchange. Similarly, many of the Actions formulated by G20-OECD are focused on “transparency” so 
as to strengthen the tax administration. Now country-by-country reporting among countries has 
commenced wherein the TNCs data is being automatically shared, and these measures would certainly 
give more strength to tax administration authorities against TNCs taxation.111 The MAC would also be 
feasible for the legitimacy of transnational administration, for instance, through a network of legally 
binding treaties. Currently, it seems like TNCs are on the upper edge than the tax administration 
authorities due to the loopholes in tax legislation, but the mutual cooperation among the countries would 
be able to balance the legitimacy and authority of the tax administration authorities against the TNCs. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation acknowledges that TNCs, in this interrelated complex globalisation phenomenon, have 
brought in a great expansion of companies’ interaction across borders. At the same time, there is a vivid 
                                                 
110 Miranda Stewart, 'Transnational Tax Law: Fiction or Reality, Future or Now?' (2016) ANU 1-42. 
111 Ibid 94. 
48 
 
gap of finding the right answer of power and degree to which transnational corporations’ tax 
administration and tax-laws are legitimate and authoritative in the globalized world. In the context of 
TNCs, the system of international taxation was enacted to eliminate the occurrences of double taxation. 
But the efforts which were focused to get rid of double taxation on TNCs triggered other problems 
relevant to tax administration such as the issue of “transfer pricing manipulation by the TNCs” (using 
their subsidiaries in different jurisdictions), and the “earning stripping issue” (by using debt allocation 
wherein TNCs borrow from the low tax jurisdiction to the high tax jurisdiction and generate interest 
deductions in the high tax jurisdiction through the subsequent interest payments and subsequently 
secure more income in the low tax jurisdiction). The TNCs also take leverage from the “hybrid mismatch 
arrangements” wherein the TNCs exploit the differences in the national tax treatment of a transfer, an 
entity, or of an instrument between two or more than two countries which results in either long-term tax 
deferral or double non-taxation. The dissertation acknowledges the fact that due to loopholes in 
international tax administration, TNCs have been in a better position even in the last few years due to 
their smart tactics to avoid and evade taxes through tax havens and tax holidays. As a countermeasure 
to these TNCs related tax avoidance and tax evasion, an international level establishment of Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was made which allows the global countries to voluntarily sign 
up so that their transparency could be checked. It had shown progress, for example, the Glencore case 
that based on the data obtained from comparable mines, Mopani Mine was giving very low taxation. 
The Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rule was enacted so as to give a hard blow to the tax 
avoidance strategies of TNCs so that they are deterred to accept artificial entities purely for taxation 
purposes. Now, the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom can tax an entity in another country 
which is controlled by the UK, Japanese, or US parent company under certain situations. It is all 
because of the implementation of CFC rules in their jurisdictions. The tax administration authorities also 
applied the Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) with an aim that TNC would be taxed only in one state 
(higher tax country or the lower), but the TNC would not be double taxed in both countries. But the 
results are not so far appraisable as double taxation issue is now again in the limelight. 
 
This whole scenario shows that for any international tax legislation, the TNCs have been trying their 
best to avoid their taxes so that they can earn more and more. The TNCs are somewhat authoritative 
in the sense that they have been successfully finding their ways through the loopholes in the 
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international taxation. To the contrary, the tax administration authorities are somewhat subdued due to 
the restrictions pertaining to cross border tax administration. In this regard, this study proposes that 
there is a great need to improve the procedures of information exchange between the countries. The 
tax harmonization process should be processed with a fast pace. And above all, the jurisdictions of tax 
should not be confined on the basis of territory. The old concept of “residence” might need an extension 
transnationally. The effectiveness of the transnational tax administration authorities might be 
strengthened if they do not track individuals merely on the basis that they are resident or non-resident 
because TNCs are able to manipulate their locations as well as their allocated income tax by smartly 
utilising the low tax jurisdictions. If the tax administration authorities keep on tracking the TNCs taxes 
based on their physical location, then how would they track the economic gains earned by those TNCs 
partnered in the trading of virtual online gaming business. Would they track the location of the gamer, 
the location of the other gamers who are playing across the globe, or the location of the servers or the 
IPs? 
 
Hence, in order to give more power to the international tax administration authorities, the world should 
focus on the key legislations such as Multilateral Convention under the guidance of Global Forum, G20, 
and OECD, in which many world states are taking part for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (MAC). The study proposes that there should be speedy and direct contacts between tax 
administrations between states to make the tax administration assistance more effective. Automatic 
data sharing through fast technological systems should be incorporated. Country-by-country reporting 
among countries has commenced wherein the TNCs data is being automatically shared, and these 
measures would certainly give more strength to tax administration authorities against TNCs taxation. 
 
It is a matter of balancing the TNCs tactics with strict but applicable international tax legislations. The 
reason being, all these legislations should make TNCs compliant to the tax laws, but it should not hurt 
them bad as it would also be bad for the world economy. Once again, this study proposed that we need 
to rethink the concept of territorial jurisdiction of TNCs in this era of globalisation. To make it all possible, 
there would be a great need of international cooperation between countries so that they empower both 
entities i.e. the TNCs as well as the tax administration authorities. The new treaties that are being 
enacted in the international tax legislation like the Multilateral Convention, Mutual Administrative 
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Assistance in Tax Matters (MAC), BEPS 15 Actions, automation in data sharing and information 
exchange between countries, and country-by-country reporting between countries, all need mutual 
cooperation only then the transnational corporations’ tax administration and tax-laws would become 
legitimate, authoritative, and balanced in the globalized world. 
 
Finding the right answer of power and degree to which transnational corporations’ tax administration 
and tax-laws are legitimate and authoritative in the globalized world is somewhat tricky. The reason 
being, it is easier said than done when it comes to measuring the power (the tax administration 
authorities) and the deception (tax evasion and tax-avoiding strategies employed by the TNCs). It is 
extremely hard, even next to impossible to measure the degree of power or the extent of deception as 
in our case of TNCs. For example, people have invented the polygraph machines to detect lie and the 
emerging field of forensic linguistics is being used in courts to detect language deception, still, to 
measure deception mathematically is a far-fetched phenomenon. To fill this gap, there needs to be a 
critical analysis mechanism which analyses both sides of the continuum i.e. the side of TNCs wherein 
they seek refuge from tax-avoiding and evading strategies, and the tax administration authorities where 
new laws and legislation are constantly being formulated and enacted in a bid to track the loopholes 
and make the TNCs to come under compliance with the law. This is the key reason that this dissertation 
employs a critical analysis methodology to get an all-inclusive overview on both sides of the picture. By 
the help of this critical analysis, it was made possible to conclude that improving the procedures of 
information exchange between the countries should be the very first priority in order to strengthen tax 
legislation. The tax harmonisation process comes on the second slot. Third, it was examined that by 
merely tracking individuals and companies on the basis of their location is an old concept on the score 
that TNCs are able to manipulate their locations in different tax jurisdictions. The comparative but critical 
methodology in this dissertation allows this study to propose that we need to rethink the concept of 
territorial jurisdiction of TNCs in this era of globalisation. Incorporation of new information systems, 
country-by-country reporting, automation in data sharing, Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (MAC), BEPS 15 Actions, all would greatly strengthen the power of tax legislation and make 
the TNCs to come under compliance with the law. 
It is also of note that this dissertation is by no means the final answer to the proposed topic, however, 
it is highly likely to serve the purpose of a stepping stone to the further the research in this field. The 
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critical analysis in this dissertation is going to make the society realise and think deeply (including the 
TNCs and Tax authorities) whether the tax laws have correctly conveyed the reality to them, or they 
need to dig deeper into the subject, conduct further researches, and perform more deeper thinking in 
order to overcome the prevailing inequalities of wealth and power in the society. This dissertation is the 
first step, but this is going to open further doors of investigation regarding critical evaluation in this field.
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